Naturalisation, registration and British citizenship - The National Archives
Children born to parents in Crown and similar service. 6. Adopted children. 7. Anguilla, Bermuda, British Antarctic Territory, British Indian Ocean. Territory, Cayman otherwise than by descent on that date unless the child was: • a British . The firm claiming that if Child born in UK to Indian parents. If, therefore, C's birth had on the date of the decision under challenge not been. Child born in the UK to Indian parents may acquire British citizenship! In a new If, therefore, C's birth had on the date of the decision under challenge not been.
Files may also contain later correspondence, mostly until the mids but some as late as Registrations of British nationality, The British Nationality Act created the new status of citizen of the United Kingdom and the colonies. Under this act, people from former colonies and British Commonwealth countries could register as British citizens. See section 4 for details of the information that records of registration contain. Renunciations and no evidence of naturalisation Among the records of naturalisation sent to The National Archives from the Home Office are records of people who have renounced their British citizenship.
The National Archives can help to prove this only by first searching for a naturalisation certificate. If you would like us to send you a letter of no evidence you will first need to request a search for a certificate of British citizenship. Naturalisations, This section covers records of foreign nationals becoming British citizens between and The Nationality Act superseded the Nationality Act which governed naturalisations up to However, certified copies are available only from The National Archives.
If you need a certified copy of a certificate from this period you can request one from our online catalogue. See section 4 for an explanation of what information naturalisation certificates and case papers contain.
There are some records of naturalisations from this period at The National Archives among the following records: Parliament Rolls in C 65 9. Naturalisations, Most foreign settlers in the UK before did not bother going through the legal formalities of naturalisation and so do not appear in these records. Before the only way to naturalise was by a private Act of Parliament.
The close rolls are in record series C To work out which pieces in C 54 to look at you will need to first consult the printed index to C 54 which itself forms a separate series, C The relevant extracts from the case and therefore the law are as follows: The relevant law is identified in the first two paragraphs as is the background in that particular case: Paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act is as follows: On 8 March she submitted an application for registration as a British Citizen under the provisions I have just set out.
On 18 May the Secretary of State refused the application. The present proceedings were begun on 17 Augustthe last day of the succeeding three months, in the Upper Tribunal, the wrong forum.
They were transferred to this Court on 14 September Sitting as a Deputy Judge, Amanda Yip QC ordered the application for permission into court for an oral hearing with consideration of the substantive claim to follow immediately if permission be granted. The Court considered the effect of S.
The Court went onto consider whether the child was entitled to registration as British.
Born in the USA? The Problem of Two Citizenships
The Court made the following findings, that are, save for the age analogous with the Applicant in this case at paragraphs 32 — 36 of the determination: I am afraid that will not do. The date of the guidance excluded it from consideration in relation to the decision-making in Al-Jeddah But the Court makes its own decision on the meaning of statelessness at that time within the context of s 40 4 and does so as a matter of statutory interpretation against the background of the Conventions.
The terms are different, and the context is different: It would also have been open to the Secretary of State to say in the course of either the Al-Jeddah litigation or this case that for the purposes of the legislation respectively under consideration the meaning of statelessness within art 1 1 was neither determinative nor directly relevant.
Our law is a dualist system, and neither the nor the Convention has as such been incorporated, so the Conventions are not part of the law, and the UNHCR guidance is not a source of English or United Kingdom law. What the Secretary of State is not entitled in my judgment to do is to say that in both s 40 4 of, and paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to, the Act, and in Part 14 of the Immigration Rules, the notion of statelessness is to be determined in accordance with its meaning in art 1 1 of the Convention, but that it has different meanings in those different provisions.
But that is what she seeks to do. In the present case, as noted above, it is specifically conceded that the meaning of statelessness is to be determined in the same way. There is no room for applying a different meaning. What it means in those provisions is determined by the Supreme Court in Al-Jeddah, which is obviously binding on me. The same meaning must apply to all the cases in which the matter is to be determined in accordance with the meaning in the Convention.
Conclusion on the meaning and effect of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Act.Why Do White Girls Like Indian Guys & What Is It Like Being Married To An Indian Man - Q&A + VLOG
The conclusions from what is set out above are as follows. For the purposes of the statutory provisions in issue, a person is stateless if he has no nationality.
Child born in the UK to Indian parents may acquire British citizenship!
Ability to acquire a nationality is irrelevant for these purposes. A child born on or after 3 Decemberoutside India, of parents at least one of whom is an Indian national, and who has not been to India, is not an Indian national unless registration of the birth has taken place in accordance with the provisions of the Citizenship Act India as amended.
If the child has no other nationality, the child is stateless for the purposes of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the British Nationality Act and, if the other requirements of that paragraph are met, is entitled to be registered as a British citizen.
However this should not mean that she suffer from having no status and that the Secretary of State ought to give consideration to and following such consideration grant either indicate that she is prepared to register the child as British in which case the parents will comply with any procedural issues, or grant a period of discretionary leave until the child does qualify as British.
It is submitted that it is not simply enough for the Secretary of State to do nothing and not to grant nationality or some form of leave to remain to an Applicant and her family in circumstances where the child is stateless, if the Secretary of State chooses not to register the then she can grant discretionary leave and the family can apply for a travel document for the child to travel until she is of an age whereby they can qualify.
There is a second limb to this case law and this relates to the interplay between nationality and articles 8 and 14 of the ECHR. If so, will such interference have consequences of such gravity as potentially to engage the operation of article 8?
If so, is such interference in accordance with the law?
If so, is such interference necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others? If so, is such interference proportionate to the legitimate public end sought to be achieved?
Question 2 above does not posit a especially high threshold for art. It simply reflects the fact that more than a technical or inconsequential interference with one of the protected rights is needed if art.
Born in the USA? The Problem of Two Citizenships
In AS Pakistan v SSHD  EWCA Civ the Court of Appeal considered that the fact of removal to Pakistan would itself interfere to some extent with private and family rights, and the degree of interference was likely to depend more on the disruptive effect of relocation itself, rather than the likely social and political conditions encountered on return. It is submitted that the question is whether the refusal of leave to remain constitutes an interference.
Turning to the issue of proportionality, unless a particular decision is necessary for the maintenance of immigration control it will not be proportionate.
There is no prior test of necessity. It is submitted that it is clear that it was and remains incumbent on the Secretary of State to have properly considered the case under Article 8 as well as the immigration rules particularly since the Administrative Court in the case of R on the application of Sunassee v the Upper Tribunal  EWHC Admin which finally laid the case of Gulshan to rest by finding that it was wrongly decided.
In this regard the Applicant relies upon the following paragraphs of Sunassee: With great respect to the Upper Tribunal which decided Gulshan it seems to me to go a little further than the source from it purports to be derived. It is the origin of the problem with paragraph 55 of the decision in the present case, and I have already averted to the difficulty with it. It is unclear to me how a Tribunal could decide whether it was arguable that there may be good grounds for granting leave to remain outside the Rules without first considering whether there may be compelling circumstances not sufficiently recognised under them.
Moreover, a Tribunal exercising statutory powers and bound by the Human Rights Act is traversing dangerous ground if it circumscribes its ability to consider the facts of the particular case before it in the round by a procedural filter. It may be that it is really a matter of how the decision is expressed, rather than how it is taken but the present case is an illustration, as I shall seek to explain, of how a proper decision may seem mystifying if expressed in unsuitable language.
Paragraph 55 suggests that where there are no arguable grounds for granting leave to remain, it is not necessary to consider whether there are any compelling circumstances not sufficiently recognised under the Rules to move on to the second stage and consider the Article 8 proportionality exercise. This is a misstatement of the law, which I have tried to state accurately above. The absence of such circumstances may abbreviate the second stage, and the way in which the decision is expressed, but does not eliminate it.
In this case, the FTT Judge did not decline to weigh the circumstances of the case on the ground that they were not exceptional.